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Abstract  
Efforts to advance our understanding of neurodegenerative diseases involve the creation 
chimeric organisms from human neural stem cells and primate embryos – known as prenatal 
chimeras.  The existence of potential mentally complex beings with human and non-human 
neural apparatus raises fundamental questions as to the ethical permissibility of chimeric 
research and the moral status of the creatures it creates.  Even as bioethicists find fewer 
reasons to be troubled by most types of chimeric organisms, social attitudes towards the 
non-human world are often influenced by religious beliefs.  In this paper scholars 
representing eight major religious traditions provide a brief commentary on a hypothetical 
case concerning the development and use of prenatal human-animal chimeric primates in 
medical research.  These commentaries reflect the plurality and complexity within and 
between religious discourses of our relationships with other species. Views on the moral 
status and permissibility of research on neural human animal chimeras vary.  The authors 
provide an introduction to those who seek a better understanding of how faith-based 
perspectives might enter into biomedical ethics and public discourse towards forms of 
biomedical research that involves chimeric organisms.   
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Introduction 
Many types of chimeric organisms are not morally controversial – humans with transplanted 
pig heart valves and blood group chimerism in non-identical twins and triplets invite no 
scientific or moral contest (Greely 2003; Robert 2006).  However the same cannot be said for 
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the types of interspecies chimeras created through the introduction of human embryonic 
stem cells into a non-human embryo or fetus (Streiffer 2005).  At the cellular level these 
creatures are mosaics such that “individual cells are derived from either the host or the 
donor but not both.” (Baylis and Robert 2007, 41)  The reasons for developing this type of 
creature are both evidentiary and therapeutic.  In the first instance the hope is that the 
‘human’ attributes of human-animal chimeras will make them a better model for biomedical 
research that seeks to understand and treat human disease.  The second potential benefit is 
that animals with human immune systems might, potentially, provide a source of 
compatible tissues for xenotransplantation (Robert 2006).  While the true scientific and 
therapeutic value of research involving engrafted embryonic chimeras remains an open 
question, regulatory authorities, concerned scientists and animal advocates have felt  
impelled to establish legal obstacles to its practice (Baylis and Robert 2007; Sherringham 
2008).  
 
Much of the concern has surrounded the development of prenatal chimeras from human 
neural stem cells in primate embryos (Greene et al. 2005). Even if it is a remote possibility 
that a being created through this process would have enhanced or ‘human-like’ cognitive or 
psychological characteristics, the ‘unnaturalness’ of  human-animal chimeras makes many 
people uncomfortable eliciting a visceral reaction against their creation (HFEA 2007; Jones 
2009).   Biomedical ethicists and moral philosophers have responded by interrogating 
arguments for and against chimeric research based on premises such as: the potential for 
harm to the creatures created for research (Streiffer 2005); the value of species integrity and 
the possible risk these creatures pose to human dignity (DeGrazia 2007; Karpowicz et al. 
2004; Melo-Martín 2008), and the potential harms of violating natural, legal and social 
categories (Eberl and Ballard 2009; Haber and Benham 2012; Robert and Baylis 2003).1  
These arguments can be respectively and loosely categorized as raising objections on the 
basis of concern for: the welfare of research participants; the integrity of natural processes; 
and, the broader social consequences of permitting chimeric research practices.  
 
Although there is by no means an absolute consensus2, many bioethicists and philosophers 
now hold the view that the biological humanisation of another species of animal poses no 
particular moral problem; and that moral humanisation is unlikely, but should it occur to the 
point of borderline personhood, then this would constitute a moral wrong (Streiffer 2011). 
Even so the issues surrounding the use of humanised chimeric organisms extend well 
beyond their intrinsic value and putative moral status.  It has been claimed that Western 
discomfort with chimeric research – more broadly – is a barrier to the efficient and rapid 
development of vaccines and cost effective treatments for diseases such as HIV, Malaria and 
dengue – neglected diseases that disproportionally effect the developing world (Bhan et al. 
2010).  
 
Against this background, it seems that in Western societies such as the UK and US, public 
attitudes on the rights and wrongs of research involving human-animal chimeras remain 
divided (Jones 2009; Office of Technology Assessment 1987). A significant number of people 
are of faith and theologians are often the first to consider the normative implications of 
biotechnological developments. It has therefore long been acknowledged in the UK, USA, 
and many other places in the world, that religious traditions should contribute towards 
                                                        
1
 Unfortunately space does not permit a detailed description of these different arguments. For a review 
of the development and regulatory impact of Bioethical positions on research involving chimeric 
organisms see: Baylis F. & Robert J. S. (2007) Part-Human Chimeras: Worrying the Facts, Probing the 
Ethics. The American Journal of Bioethics 7, 41-5.; and, Harvey A. & Salter B. (2012) Anticipatory 
Governance: Bioethical Expertise for Human/Animal Chimeras. Science as Culture 21, 291-313. 
2
 See for example: Midgley M. (2000) Biotechnology and monstrosity: why we should pay attention to 
the “yuk factor”. Hastings Center Report 30, 7-15. 
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framing the regulation of novel forms of biomedical research and clinical practice.3 Religious 
discourses offer concepts and structures through which to understand our relationship with 
other species, our place in nature, and tell us what our obligations to other forms of life 
should be. Even as the involvement of religious scholars in public debates about new 
technologies has a long and fruitful tradition, to date there has been little public discussion 
of religious positions on the moral permissibility of chimeric research, or indeed about how 
faith based perspectives might influence public attitudes towards its practice.4  To this end, 
we solicited commentaries on a hypothetical case (see below) from scholars representing 
eight major religious traditions. 
 
 
 
Contributors were called upon to provide first person interpretations of what they took to 
be the ‘most salient issues’ confronting the central character. David’s story explicitly and 
implicitly asked contributors to be prescriptive in the sense that it steers them to make 
judgments or construct ways of seeing animal experimentation as right or wrong and offer 
recommendations.  Our contributors responded with public moral statements grounded in 
different faith traditions. The commentaries do not attempt to exhaustively survey the 
relevant discourse or views within these traditions, and other members of these traditions 
may well draw alternative conclusions from the same or different authoritative sources. The 
                                                        
3
 Regulatory jurisdictions in which faith-based positions on research involving chimeric organisms 
have been submitted to statutory bodies include the United Kingdom and Singapore. See for example: 
The Church of Scotland. (2005) Reponse on the review of the Human Fertilisation and Embryology 
Act. Church and Society Council and the Science Religion and Technology Project; Catholic Bishops' 
Conference of England and Wales. (2007) Catholic Bishops' Conference of England and Wales and 
Linacre Centre for Healthcare Ethics Joint Response to the Human Tissue and Embryos, Mission and 
Public Affairs Council. (2010) Response to the Academy of Medical Sciences’ Call for Evidence: 
‘Animals Containing Human Material’. Church of England; and, The Bioethics Advisory Committee. 
(2010) Human-Animal Combinations in Stem Cell Research. Singapore. 
4
 This is not the case with research involving transgenesis and genetically modified organisms. See for 
example: Bruce D. & Bruce A. (1998) Engineering genesis: the ethics of genetic engineering in non-
human species. Earthscan Publications Ltd.; and Brunk C. G. & Coward H. G. (2009) Acceptable 
genes?: religious traditions and genetically modified foods. SUNY Press. 
Hypothetical case:  
David is a technician in a medical research facility.  Part of David’s daily work involves 
the creation of, and care for, the human-animal chimeras employed in the laboratory’s 
program of experimentation. (Interspecies chimeras are creatures that result from the 
introduction of genes, cellular material or body parts from one species into another 
different species. Most commonly, non-human animals are ‘humanised’ through the 
introduction of human genes, in order to facilitate research on human disease models or to 
generate specific biological products or therapies.) 
 
David’s research group has recently begun a series of investigations into Alzheimer’s 
disease and David has been asked to develop a new type of primate model to help explore 
the pathological processes underlying the human disease.  The procedure involves the 
injection of increasingly large doses of human neural (brain) stem cells into macaque 
embryos.  The aim is to find the ‘dose’ that reliably produces a network of functional 
human neurons in a standardised nonhuman animal model. The ethics approval under 
which this research is being undertaken stipulates that the resulting chimeras must have no 
more than 10% human neural tissue. 
 
David finds these developments to be particularly troubling. Although he believes that this 
research has enormous potential, he is concerned about whether it is ‘right’ to introduce 
functional human brain (stem) cells into the brains of other species – and whether through 
this process the laboratory animals somehow become ‘more human’.  He also feels unsure 
as to whether ‘humanising’ these macaque means that they should be treated differently 
while they are alive and that they should not (as easily) be destroyed. 
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commentaries do, however, offer the considered responses of leading experts from each 
religious tradition and each are grounded in the key texts and in scholarly and popular 
interpretations of the respective doctrines.  
 
An Anglican Perspective  
The Revd Professor Andrew Linzey is an Anglican priest, a member of the Faculty of Theology 
in the University of Oxford, and Director of the Oxford Centre for Animal Ethics 
(www.oxfordanimalethics.com). His 20 books include Animal Theology (SCM Press/University 
of Illinois Press, 1994) and Why Animal Suffering Matters (Oxford University Press, 2009). 
 
The Anglican Communion is a collection of autonomous churches all holding some allegiance 
to the historic See of Canterbury. Anglican churches are typically both catholic and 
reformed. There is no centralised teaching authority and Anglicanism prides itself on being a 
“broad church”. Resolutions of the Lambeth Conference of Anglican bishops, held every ten 
years, have only advisory status and each province or country has its own autonomous 
synod of bishops, clergy and laity.  Therefore, one will find a wide diversity of belief and 
practice within Anglicanism. There is no one Anglican view on animal experiments as there is 
no one view on capital punishment, same-sex relations, abortion or environmental issues. 
The consensus on all these issues has changed and is continually changing. 
 
That said, experimentation on animals, or “vivisection” as it was historically known, has been 
a particular source of controversy since its emergence in Britain in the nineteenth century. 
Notable Anglicans, such as Lord Shaftesbury, John Ruskin, Edward King, Lewis Carroll 
(Charles L. Dodgson), William Thompson (Archbishop of York), Marcus Beresford (Primate of 
Ireland) and numerous bishops opposed the practice. In 1880, Baron Ernst von Weber said 
that the anti-vivisection movement had grown so quickly in England because of “the 
religious tendency of the English nation” and “the warm support of the … clergy”. The chief 
theological objection was that cruelty was incompatible with Christian life – an idea which 
also gave rise to the establishment of the first national anti-cruelty organisation in the 
world, the Royal Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals in 1824, founded by the 
Anglican priest Arthur Broome. 
 
But with the passing of the 1876 Cruelty to Animals Act, which established and sought to 
regulate experimentation, Anglicans came gradually to accept the practice, as witnessed by 
the support of 16 bishops who became vice-presidents of the Research Defence Society (the 
leading pro-vivisection society) in 1911. They argued that research on animals was justifiable 
if it leads to cures for human diseases.   
Disagreement, however, about how far scientific procedures can be justified has continued 
to characterise Anglican moral theology to the present day. C. S. Lewis (1947) famously 
argued in his pamphlet on Vivisection that “Once the old Christian idea of a total difference 
in kind between man and beast has been abandoned, then no argument for experiments on 
animals can be found which is not also an argument for experiments on inferior men”. 
 
The latest Anglican thinking is expressed in the Church of England’s Mission and Public 
Affairs Council (2010) report to the Academy of Medical Science’s Call for Evidence on 
“Animals Containing Human Material” (hereafter “MPAC”). While not commenting generally 
on the use of sentient animals in experiments (or wanting to justify all such 
experimentation), it clearly draws the line at research on primates because of their “innate 
and recognisable ability for higher thought and emotion”. It recommended that “Research 
ought not to be permitted on born primates that may cause them pain, distress or 
significant loss of social interaction”. 
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The idea that non-human primates can simply be regarded as “animal models” would be 
theologically difficult for most Anglicans. At the very least they are fellow creatures and 
therefore deserve respect. Human “dominion” does not mean “despotism” rather that we 
are to care for other species as God would care for them. We are to act as responsible carers 
accountable to God. To think that we can sometimes make use of animals does not mean 
that they are all expendable for human use. As the Anglican Report Man and Nature (1975) 
insisted: “To imagine that God has created the whole universe solely for man’s use and 
pleasure is a mark of folly”. 
The point is especially relevant when considering the status of specifically sentient beings 
(i.e., those beings capable of pain and pleasure). These are beings who have a capacity not 
only for pain, but also mental suffering including fear, stress, trauma, anticipation, terror 
and distress. We therefore owe such creatures a duty not to harm them. This is derived 
theologically from our status in creation: our moral superiority should require us to 
acknowledge duties to them that they cannot acknowledge towards us. Being made in the 
image of a holy, just and loving God means that we should rather characterise ourselves as 
the “servant species rather than as the master species” (Linzey and Kramer 1995). 
 
The conclusion from this theology is inevitably restrictive in relation to David’s work.  The 
MPAC Report holds that research involving animals containing human material ought to 
continue to be permitted, but lays down such stringent conditions that it is difficult to see 
how such work could in fact be ethically continued. The conditions include not allowing 
cytoplasmic hybrid embryos to develop beyond 14 days;  not allowing research if it may 
result in an animal with significantly enhanced cognitive functions characteristic of human 
persons;  not allowing research if it may result in a live creature that contains such a mixture 
of human and animal material that it is difficult to determine its status; not allowing 
research if it is likely to lead to the formation of human germ-lines in animals; not allowing 
research that may give rise to an animal whose cognitive functions have been enhanced to a 
level where borderline personhood may be attributed to it, and research ought not to be 
permitted that involves animal embryos or foetuses containing human material being 
implanted in a human womb. 
 
Other Anglicans would go further and maintain that it is intrinsically wrong to create hybrids 
in any form and that such interference constitutes a lack of respect for creatures, both 
human and animal. They would maintain that the “integrity of creation” as supposed by 
many church statements precludes such intervention. To the utilitarian argument that the 
ends justify the means, and that there may be benefits to this research, it would have to be 
replied that not everything that can be done should be done. It cannot be right to pursue 
even good ends by unethical means.  
 
A Buhddist Perspective  
Lisa Kemmerer is a well-traveled philosopher-activist dedicated to working against 
oppression, whether on behalf of the environment, nonhuman animals, or disempowered 
human beings. Her books include Animals and World Religions and Sister Species: Women, 
Animals, and Social Justice. 
   
Buddhism teaches five basic precepts (laws or rules) by which to live, the first and most 
fundamental of which forbids killing living beings. This precept does not offer exceptions for 
selfish human interests—we may not kill for food, clothing, or hoped-for medical gains. A 
similar but more stringent moral imperative, ahimsa, forbids harming “any living being” 
(Dhammapada 74).  The Buddhist “Dhammika” (Sutta Nipata 393 [see Fausböll, 1881])  
connects the first precept with ahimsa, instructing Buddhists not to kill, not to cause to kill 
(for instance, purchasing products tested on animals or animal products), not to incite 
others to kill (supporting animal experimentation or factory farming financially or verbally), 
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and not to injure any sentient being (including any exploitative use of others, such as for 
science, food, clothing, or entertainment) (Fausböll 1881, 66). Whether a macaque in a lab 
or a hen in a cage, Buddhist philosophy honors all sentient beings—their interests in living 
and maintaining bodily integrity, and their interests in freedom from human exploitation 
and/or manipulation.   
 
Karma (literally “action”) is also critical to Buddhist morality. Future lives are inevitably 
shaped by choices: Actions determine futures as surely as “the wheel follows the foot of the 
ox that draws the carriage” (Burtt 1955, 52). Karma determines our future incarnations 
based, in part, on how our choices affect other living beings (including humans, chimeras, 
and fish).  Karma highlights the importance of honoring the first precept and practicing 
ahimsa, and also holds the key to understanding species interpenetrability. Across billions of 
years of reincarnation, the atman (soul) transmigrates from one being to another.  As a 
result, each individual has been every other entity’s mother, brother, lover, child, and best 
friend across time.  For example, the atman in the chimera that David exploits might 
previously have been his dear old grandmother or his faithful dog. In a universe governed by 
karma and reincarnation, we cannot exploit other living beings while respecting parents, 
grandparents, or any other loved one.   
 
Some are likely to argue that Alzheimer’s research is for a good cause, that such research 
respects life—especially elders—and is therefore well-intentioned (good karma). The truth is 
that non-animal alternatives are less costly, more dependable, and do not directly cause 
suffering, and will therefore be the choice of any informed, sincere researcher. Furthermore, 
the nature of research is that outcomes are uncertain. It is therefore unconscionable to 
trade off on the very real suffering of nonhumans in the hope of some possible gain to 
humans.  Still, Buddhist morality is not concerned with any of these truths, but rather with 
the moral imperative that we not harm or kill other beings—whether or not such harm or 
killing might bring benefits.   
 
Others are likely to argue that human beings are not in the same category as other animals, 
and that a chimera is a special sort of being who also deserves separate consideration—a 
little less consideration that a full-fledged human being, but more consideration than 
nonhuman animals. Buddhist morality requires, most fundamentally, that we abstain from 
killing or harming any living being.  Chimeras are living beings, as are chickens, pigeons, fish, 
mice, and deer.  Buddhist teachings expose the shallow ego-centrism of those who believe 
that they and their kind are more important than others, and their kind. Such self-serving 
arrogance has no place in Buddhist morality. The Buddhist worldview does not envision 
human beings as separate and distinct—let alone above other animals.  Through the process 
of reincarnation, a dog is a human is a mouse is a chimera.  Buddhists offer the same moral 
protection to all sentient beings. Buddhist philosophy and morality would not have us 
protect a chimera because he or she is more human, but simply because we may not harm 
or kill any living being.  
  
A Catholic Perspective  
John Berkman teaches moral theology at Regis College, University of Toronto.  He writes on 
Thomistic ethics, medical ethics, and animal ethics.  He has recently published “Are We 
Addicted to the Suffering of Animals?  Animal Cruelty and the Catholic Moral Tradition” in A 
Faith Embracing All Creatures (Wipf & Stock, 2012) 
 
At its best, the Catholic moral tradition affirms that all animals (human and non-human) 
have intrinsic goodness.  The primary purpose of all animals is to glorify God in their being 
and flourishing.  Human animals, having a rational nature, are persons with a particular 
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dignity and a “right to life and physical integrity from the moment of conception until 
death." (1997, §2273) It is morally wrong to kill or seriously harm innocent persons. 
 
The tradition has always understood that sub-personal animals have a secondary purpose of 
aiding persons.  Thus, “[m]edical and scientific experimentation on animals is a morally 
acceptable practice if it remains within reasonable limits and contributes to caring for or 
saving human lives.” (CCC §2417)  On the other hand, Catholics “must show [non-human 
animals] kindness”, can appropriately love particular non-human animals, and must “not 
cause animals to suffer or die needlessly.” (CCC §2457, §2418)   
 
Since the just use of sub-personal animals requires serious purposes, experimentation on 
non-human animals may well be morally problematic if there are other means of achieving 
this knowledge. (see CCC §2457).   Furthermore, since some kinds of animals (e.g. primate, 
cetaceans) can be expected to suffer more than others (e.g. some rodents or amphibians), 
creating chimeras with primates would appear more problematic than chimeras with 
rodents or amphibians.  
 
We tend to think only of human beings as persons.  However, since persons are creatures 
that by their nature have ‘rational’ qualities, other species (including chimeras) could be 
judged to be persons depending on their rational capacities.  Thus, in creating a chimera 
(e.g. macaque with human brain tissue), determining whether it is a person would depend 
on an experiential evaluation of its rational capacities.    
 
The Catholic moral tradition’s primary concern with human experimentation is that persons 
may be seriously harmed with no commensurate benefit to them (CCC §2295).  However, for 
the love of God and neighbour, Catholics may undergo risks to their life and health.  Thus, 
the tradition praises live organ donation as a noble form of self-gift if freely and 
authentically chosen by the donor, if done for the right reason, and if the potential good to 
be realized is commensurate to the potential sacrifice of the one undergoing 
experimentation. 
 
While the authoritative Catholic moral tradition says very little about the morality of the 
creation of chimeras, the principles of the tradition can be brought to bear on key questions.  
First and foremost, in considering whether to create and experiment on human-macaque 
chimeras, David must ask himself whether these chimeras would be persons?  While one 
cannot definitively know until one understands the rational capacities of the kind of being 
created, this should be a major concern.   
 
Even if he concludes that neither a macaque nor the macaque-human chimera is a person, 
the following questions remain: 
 
Is the creation of these chimeras the only way to do this research work?  The fact 
that it might be the least expensive or marginally superior to other approaches 
would not be a morally adequate response.   
 
What other morally problematic practices might be required to create this chimera? 
For example, are the human neural cells obtained from the destruction of human 
embryos or by other means that the Catholic moral tradition rejects?  If so, then 
David will need to consider the extent to which he is cooperating with (or in fact 
engaging in) wrongful acts, and consider stopping this work, either asking to be 
transferred to other work in the company or seeking work elsewhere. 
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Finally, if the plan involves experimenting on the chimeras, there should be a real sense of 
gratitude to them and legitimate regret for what they will undergo. This regret should be 
displayed in the kind of care given to them.  Concern for their general welfare will include 
setting up an environment for them that allows them to otherwise (relatively) flourish in 
their captive state i.e. they should be kept in an environment that rivals (or betters) the very 
best zoos.   
 
Ultimately, how the human-macaque chimeras should be treated cannot be separated from 
the question of their particular ends and purposes.   As stated above, we cannot know the 
rationality of such chimeras (i.e. whether they are persons) until we are confronted with 
them in action.  However, until we know, the appropriate principle from the Catholic moral 
tradition is one of giving such chimeras the benefit of the doubt, and giving them greater (as 
opposed to lesser) moral consideration. However, if it was ethical to create these chimeras 
(and I have raised serious doubts from the Catholic moral tradition), then such creatures 
should be given respect approaching that given to persons, until we have good reason to 
believe otherwise. 
  
A Confucian Perspective  
Dr.Zhen Cai is an associate professor of philosophy at East China Normal University, 
Shanghai, China. Her research interests include ethical issues in genetics, Confucian ethics, 
contemporary virtue ethics, and Kantian ethics. She has published a book on virtue ethics and 
contributed articles to various peer-review journals.  
  
Confucianism is a long and complicated tradition, and it is somewhat dubious to talk about 
“the Confucian perspective.” I will mostly focus on the ideas of one influential Confucian 
thinker, Mencius. 
 
For Mencius, human beings are not autonomous individuals that are human because of 
some inborn qualities (having a soul, having reason, able to suffer, etc.).  Rather, “human” is 
a moral and social concept.  Without proper human relationships (father and son, husband 
and wife, ruler and subject, etc.) and without certain virtues (compassion in particular), 
something that looks like a human cannot be properly called a human. Moral concern begins 
with the care for family members, and then should be cultivated toward others, animals, 
plants, and eventually everything in the universe.  This care should be graded or 
differentiated.  It is natural and justified that we care for those who are close to us more 
than those who are distant from us. This means that when both the potential benefits to 
humans and the risks of experiments on humans are high (such as the case of developing 
medicines for serious diseases), it is justified, according to Confucianism, to use animals and 
even to take their life for the purpose of humans’ well-being. But we as humans should also 
be compassionate toward animals.  Thus, the animal experiments should be conducted in a 
serious and careful way that causes the least pain on animals, and any arbitrary and cruel 
treatments of animals during the experiments are not accepted (Fan 2010).  Indeed, if the 
benefit to humans is small, but the pain to animals is great, a Mencian can even object to 
experiments on animals.   
 
When we turn to the specific case of experiments involving human-animal chimeras (HACs), 
the most disturbing part for David is that he considers these animals more or less 
“humanized” through the introduction of human stem cell. This presupposes that the 
human-ness somehow lies in those “human” cells, and so their injection into animals makes 
these HACs somewhat human.  But as was argued, for Mencius, to have biologically human 
cells doesn’t make HACs or anything else human. Even a biological human can be considered 
not-human if he or she doesn’t develop proper social relations and moral virtues.  Moreover, 
for Confucians, our preferential treatment of humans is not necessarily based on the 
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superiority of humans in mental capacities, but can be appealed to our natural tendency of 
associating with fellow humans.  This natural association gives our fellow human beings 
more care than others (Tongdong Bai 2009). Furthermore, the moral status of different 
animals is not determined in terms of their innate capacities either, but their social and 
psychological association with humans. Those animals that have accompanied us as pets and 
labored for us deserve more concerns than those living in distance. Their close relationship 
with human beings renders them higher moral status Wild animals, by contrast, are allowed 
to be hunted and eaten insofar as the regulations and restrictions on when and how to take 
them being followed. In this sense, a dog, as a pet, can have greater moral status than a wild 
chimp even though the latter is more intelligent and closer to human according to biological 
categories.   
 
Given the above ideas, for the Confucians, having some human cells, and even having some 
innate mental capacities are not decisively relevant to moral status. In David’s situation, the 
sufferings of these HACs are significant to us, not because they will develop humanlike 
cognitive capacities, but because the expressions of their sufferings remind us of the similar 
kind of sufferings of our own.  
 
Of course, there are limits on not treating HACs as humans even from a Confucian 
perspective.  If HACs are made look like human beings and have the capacity of developing 
human relations and compassion, Confucians may consider using them for medical 
experiments problematic.  Indeed, to experiment on them would be rather similar to 
experimenting on human beings—“human beings” in a Confucian sense.   
 
An Evangelical Perspective  
Karen Swallow Prior Ph.D. is Professor of English at Liberty University and a member of the 
Faith Advisory Council of the Humane Society of the United States. She is the author of 
‘Booked: Literature in the Soul of Me’ and a contributing writer for Christianity Today and 
The Atlantic. 
 
Despite a spirit of activism across a range of issues, Evangelicals have been largely silent on 
the topic of animal experimentation and would thus be ill-equipped to advise David in his 
dilemma.  Evangelicalism’s silence on animal experimentation is puzzling in light of the 
positions of prominent Evangelical leaders from the movement’s beginnings in the 1700’s 
until the present day (Graham 2012; Wesley 1806).  Instead Evangelicalism is influenced by 
long held Christian and social traditions which emphasize a categorical distinction between 
humans and animals: imago dei that sets humanity apart from the rest of creation; whereby 
humans are given dispensation to use animals under God. Intertwined with these secular 
philosophies are two biblically-derived views based on the Genesis account of creation, 
“dominion” and its more benevolent counterpart, “stewardship,” both of which view 
animals from an anthropocentric rather than theocentric perspective (see Linzey and Cohn-
Sherbok 1997).  In the absence of any coherent, unified Evangelical position on animal 
experimentation, elements of each of these views are usually found in Evangelical practice 
as, for example, in the emphasis on saving souls at the expense of creation care or opposing 
animal cruelty because of its dehumanizing effects, and because concern for animals is a 
Biblical mandate.   
 
A theocentric view of animal/human relations would affirm the position of most Evangelicals 
that the imago dei is stamped in each human life at conception within the unique biological 
entity that will become an individual person (i. e., the zygote), not in an individual human 
cell such as sperm, egg, or brain cell. Thus, in the traditional Evangelical view, David’s 
insertion of human cells into an animal would not alter the moral status of the animal nor 
the ethical apparatus to be applied to its treatment.  Indeed the destruction of human cells 
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has negligible moral significance compared to the destruction of a bearer of God’s image. 
However, the creation of human-animal chimeras elicits several moral and theological 
questions as to the importance of human dignity. 
 
A theocentric view of animal/human relations would not only uphold the biblical grounds for 
human dignity, but could also alter Evangelical support for animal experimentation. Viewing 
animals in terms of God’s original purpose and design rather than in terms of how animals 
can be used for putative human gain would severely delimit animal experimentation, 
particularly human-animal hybrids. A theocentric view would not necessarily equate the 
gnat and the gorilla, but a view of their place in creation and the treatment each species 
deserves that is based on the relationship of each species to God rather than to humans 
would offer a paradigm shift with untold implications.  It would uphold the Evangelical 
understanding of the creation account in Genesis. As one Christian bioethicist argues, 
chimeras raise a “fundamental Christian concern” by violating a “divinely created order” in 
which “plants, animals, and humans always reproduce after their own kind or seed.” Hence 
the creation of human-animal hybrids “runs counter to the sacredness of human life and 
man created in the image of God.” (Jones 2003)  Further—and simply—just because science 
can do something doesn’t mean it should. Indeed the Biblical account of the world after the 
Fall prescribes the use of animals only for labor, clothing and food. Not only does the Bible 
not explicitly enjoin animal experimentation, but it explicitly commands kindness and 
compassion toward animals. An Evangelical approach to David’s dilemma that reflects the 
history of Evangelicalism and the primacy it places on scriptural authority would inform 
David that while the humanized animal is not a human being made in the image of God that 
must be treated as such, animals were not created by God to suffer in humanity’s stead.  
 
A Hindu Perspective  
Dr Anna King is Reader in Theology and Religious Studies in the University of 
Winchester, convenor of the Oxford Spalding Symposium on Indian Religions 
(http://spaldingsymposium.org/) and editor of Religions of South Asia (RoSA) 
(www.equinoxpub.com/rosa).  Anna is the author of a forthcoming book, Animal Theology 
and Ethics in Indian Religions, to be published by Palgrave Macmillan. 
 
Hinduism does not have a unified system of beliefs, but is rather an umbrella term for a 
variety of religious traditions. At the heart of Hinduism are not individual human rights, but 
the concept of dharma, the universal principle of law, order, harmony and truth. The 
purpose of dharma is not only to attain a union of the soul with supreme reality; it also 
suggests a code of conduct that is intended to secure worldly happiness and harmony. The 
question then is whether animal experimentation, and the creation of interspecies 
constructs are dharmic. 
   
Hindu scriptures teach that there is a fundamental oneness of all living beings, and that all 
beings possess souls which are eternal. All living beings, regardless of their physical form, are 
atman, individual units of consciousness. Causing suffering to any living being is therefore 
the greatest offence (Chapple 1993).  Similarly in Hindu theologies all sentient beings move 
through multiple (re)births and deaths, influenced by their past ethical actions. According to 
their karma, humans can be reborn as animals and animals reborn as humans. Consequently 
it is the duty of humans to avoid species discrimination, and to cultivate a feeling of 
kindliness and love for all living creatures. Thus for many Hindus allowing all sentient beings 
to live out their karmically-determined lifespan is critical.  The doctrine of ahimsa (non-
violence) also encourages humans to treat animals well, and leads many to regard their 
instrumental use as ethically unacceptable. Hindus who support a version of creationism 
share uneasiness about the transgression of species boundaries and in particular the 
replacement of animal neurons by human neurons. They argue that the creation of human-
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animal hybrids is ‘playing God’; that it goes against the divine will, ‘nature’ and genetic 
integrity, creating moral, spiritual and biological confusion.   
 
These are powerful ethical arguments against animal experimentation of any kind, and many 
Hindus would argue that the pursuit of even good ends by unethical means is wrong. 
Nevertheless David’s dilemma is not resolved so simply. While Hindus accept that all living 
beings have souls, most discriminate in practice between the moral statuses of different 
species; there is an assumption that some animals are more spiritually evolved than others. 
Research which aims to develop a new type of primate model by injecting an increasingly 
large dose of human neural stem cells into macaque embryos might be seen as more 
problematic than experiments involving dogs, rats or mice, but less problematic than 
research involving cows. Moreover, Hinduism might be better able to cope with the 
humanisation of chimeras than some other religions, because there is some fluidity between 
human and animal categories.  From early childhood Hindus are familiar with the idea of 
divine chimeras as the examples of Ganesha, Hanuman and Narasimha show.  
 
While many Hindus accept that the most fundamental guideline for conduct is the 
prohibition against the bringing of harm and/or death to any living being, on the whole 
Hindu tradition supports advances that enable humans and other animals to flourish. 
Proponents therefore argue that the most important advances in modern medicine would 
not have been possible without animal experimentation, and justify such experimentation 
ethically as offering to both human and other animals a better quality of life.  
 
In Hinduism what might be called situational ethics, the importance of time, place, 
circumstance and person in ethical choice, can never be underestimated.  What is dharma in 
one set of circumstances becomes adharma in another. Thus in the 21st century the 
possibility of mitigating the enormous burden of suffering caused by Alzheimer’s or 
Parkinson's disease, will be an important consideration for Hindu theologians and ethicists 
as well as for the scientists and technicians burdened by the ethical dilemmas their research 
involves.   
 
If we consider David’s dilemma we see that the appeal to the positive consequences in 
terms of scientific and therapeutic applications is the strongest argument in favour of 
research on chimeras. Advocates see the production of life saving technologies and the 
development of solutions to important global health problems as justifying their creation. In 
the final analysis therefore the unsatisfactory answer to David’s dilemma for many Hindus 
may be that each human being has to weigh up the ethical possibilities and karmic outcomes 
in the light of religious and philosophical reflection and make the final decision for 
themselves. 
 
An Islamic Perspective 
Dr. Tlili is a scholar of Arab and Islamic studies at the University of Florida.  Her primary 
research interests are stylistics of the Qur’an, animals in Islam and Arabic literature.  Her 
books include Animals in the Qur'an, published in 2012 by Cambridge University Press 
Like other world traditions, Islam encompasses many views on the question of animal 
experimentation.  Considering the limited scope of this article and the fact that the Qur'an 
and the Ḥadīth (Prophetic tradition) are generally considered the main sources of authority 
in Islam, I will limit my discussion mostly to a reading of these two texts. The Qur'an and the 
Ḥadīth do not address the question of animal experimentation directly, but their general 
position on nonhuman animals can inform this debate.  
Both the Qur'an and the Ḥadīth allow Muslims to derive benefits from many animal species. 
Most notably, Muslims are allowed to kill certain animals for food, to consume many animal 
products, and to use camels and equines for transportation. On the other hand, both texts 
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impose numerous restrictions on these uses. From the Ḥadīth's insistence on animals' 
welfare, Muslim jurists derived the principle of animals' "ḥurma," or inviolability, which 
translates into a set of God-given rights that nonhuman animals have against their owners, 
and, for that matter, against humanity at large. With the exception of the sanction to kill 
animals for food, there is one shared underlying principle: humans may derive benefits from 
other animals provided that these benefits do not conflict with animals' interests. Muslims 
have duties toward domestic animals, including the obligation to feed and protect them 
from danger. 
Thus, the main rule that seems to govern the human-nonhuman animal relations, at least 
according to certain Islamic textual sources, is that of mutual benefit and exchange of 
services, founded on the principle of respect for and inviolability (ḥurma) of animal's 
wellbeing.  
 
Considering this emphasis, even the permissibility to kill certain animals for food can hardly 
be interpreted as prioritization of humans' interests; rather, it appears to fit within a larger 
ecological worldview. Humans are simply one among other species that are allowed to 
consume meat and be part of the ecological fabric. It should be noted also that the Ḥadīth 
stresses that animal slaughter be performed in the least painful way possible (both 
physically and psychologically), and that the name of God be pronounced upon killing an 
animal.  
 
In view of the above, it is reasonable to conclude that animal experimentation can hardly be 
justified by Islamic teachings, since it conflicts with nonhuman animals' interests. Two points 
provide further substantiation to this view. First, when the Prophet was once asked about 
the possibility of using a frog for medicinal purposes he did not allow such use (Abū Dāwūd 
1952, 3873). Second, the Qur'an is critical of those who "alter God's creation" (Q.4:119), a 
statement that has often been read in relation to animals, for example, as implying the 
prohibition of animal castration. If one can apply this verse to castration, it is difficult not to 
see it as applicable to chimeras. 
 
Some Muslims may find an Islamic justification for animal experimentation in the principle 
of "maslaḥa", or (human) Public Good. In fact, the Ḥanafī school of jurisprudence often 
applied this principle to expand humans' privileges and allow many uses of animals which, 
strictly speaking, seem to contradict the teachings of the Ḥadīth. It is not my position to 
evaluate this standpoint. I would however encourage David, and, for that matter, any 
Muslim, to acquaint themselves with traditional Islamic teachings on animals. David's 
concerns, in fact, are deeply anthropocentric. Chimeras seem to matter to him only because 
they are "humanized." This position is at odds with the level of recognition and attention 
Islamic tradition has historically shown to the interests of nonhuman animals. David, 
however, is hardly unrepresentative of modern Muslim views. This is in part due to major 
changes in educational systems in the Muslim world, whereby exposure to traditional 
knowledge has become limited whereas the ideals of modernity have often been accepted 
unquestionably. 
 
Respect for nonhuman animals' welfare should not be interpreted as a stand against 
scientific research, of course. A cursory survey of Islamic history reveals great dedication to 
scientific knowledge. These Ethical restrictions should rather be interpreted as an incentive 
to think more creatively, so that one species' happiness does not come at the cost of other 
species' wretchedness. 
 
A Jewish Perspective 
Rabbi Elliot Dorff is is Rector and Distinguished Professor of Philosophy at the American 
Jewish University, Chair of the Conservative/Masorti Movement’s Committee on Jewish Law 
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and Standards, and author of twelve books, one of which is Matters of Life and Death: A 
Jewish Approach to Modern Medical Ethics 
 
The Torah contains laws demanding that we minimize pain to animals. For example, we may 
not yoke a donkey and an ox together (Deuteronomy 22:10), for that would put tremendous 
physical strain on the donkey, and animals are to be allowed to rest on the Sabbath day 
(Exodus 20:10).  The Torah even forbids causing animals psychological pain, as, for example, 
when it prohibits the muzzling of an ox working on the threshing floor (Deuteronomy 25:4), 
for then he would constantly see food that he could not eat.  The Rabbis summarized that 
concern in their blanket principle of tza’ar ba’alei hayyim, that we may not cause pain to 
animals unnecessarily.   
 
At the same time, a fundamental value of the Jewish tradition is that we preserve human 
life.  In fact, a Jew not only may, but must violate all but three of the Torah’s 
commandments, if necessary, in order to save a person’s life.  This is ultimately based on the 
Jewish conviction that our bodies belong to God. We must therefore avoid undue risk and 
engage in behaviors of proper diet, hygiene, exercise, and sleep in order to preserve God’s 
property. Thus, even though the Jewish tradition very much respects and tries to protect 
animals, it sees them as created by God for the service of humanity.  Some human uses of 
animals are morally questionable, such as slaughtering elephants for their tusks or using 
animals to perfect cosmetics, but experiments using animals to advance human health are 
both permissible and preferable to using humans for such experiments.   Moreover, if one 
can conduct experiments using only animal tissues rather than full animals so that the 
animals need not be killed or adversely affected, that would be even better.  The common 
practice of testing therapies on animals before trying them out on humans, though, is 
exactly what the Jewish tradition would advocate. 
 
The Psalmist says, “How many are the things You have made, O Lord; You have made them 
all with wisdom; the earth is full of Your creations” (Psalms 104:24).  This expresses 
admiration for each of the various species God has made, with no hierarchy of value among 
them -- except for humans, who are, according to Genesis (1:27; 5:1; 9:6), uniquely created 
in the image of God. This special status permits us to use animals for our purposes, with 
some restrictions.  One set of such restrictions are the dietary laws. These limits on eating 
animals, though, do not apply to using any nonhuman animals to devise cures for human 
diseases, for the mandate to cure supercedes the dietary laws.  Still, because of the 
requirement that we not cause undue pain to animals, animals whose neurological 
structures are more primitive and thus experience less physical and psychological pain are 
preferable for use in experiments. 
 
The Torah prohibits mixing various kinds of seeds and animals: “You shall not let your cattle 
mate with a different kind; you shall not sow your field with two kinds of seeds; you shall not 
put on cloth from a mixture of two kinds of materials” (Leviticus 19:19; see also 
Deuteronomy 22:9, 11).  The concern here seems to be to preserve the order of nature, with 
each species distinct from the other.   
 
Rabbis, though, have generally maintained that the mandate to cure disease supercedes 
these laws.  Thus an opinion unanimously approved by the Conservative Movement’s 
Committee on Jewish Law and Standards, says this: 
  
Much good can be derived from this ability to alter flawed genes to eliminate 
malformations and overcome disease…  Thus the ability to create transgenic 
animals who bear or lack traits that mimic human diseases has enormous 
potential for research…. Judaism’s emphasis on healing individuals who are sick is 
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likely to override any combination of concerns that might otherwise impact the 
technique. (Reisner 1997) 
 
The bulk of Rabbi Reisner’s ruling concerns whether Jews are permitted to eat foods made 
with altered genes, which he ultimately permits.  As quoted above, however, he notes that 
even if they were not kosher for general consumption, they may be used to cure.  Clearly, 
David should seek to cause as little pain to the research animals as possible, but with that 
done, he should engage in the research without moral reservation. 
 
Discussion  
Religious traditions are sets of beliefs about the causes, order and purpose of the world that, 
except for the Taoic traditions, make reference to God(s) or other divine beings. Religious 
thought is the prism through which people of faith view the world.  It provides a source of 
meaning and a moral code that is central to the construction of their views on issues of 
scientific and moral importance. People’s faith shapes their attitudes towards and decisions 
about the nature, purpose and ethical implications of human-animal chimera creation, and 
other types of research involving chimeric organisms.  Moreover religious discourse can 
confer moral legitimacy on actions and practice. In this way the commentaries above 
provide knowledge of the ideal ways acting and ideal reasons for acting in relation to David’s 
Dilemma.  The positions articulated above are personal prescriptions.  They are drawn from 
the religious teaching and traditions our commentators found to be most pertinent to the 
problems faced, and not an attempt to represent the faith tradition in general. They do not 
attempt to describe a typical perspective or even describe the full breadth of perspectives 
regarding chimeric research within their faith tradition. In regard to this, most 
commentators were careful to emphasise that there is no consensus within their faith 
traditions on the moral propriety of animal experimentation. Religions are internally diverse, 
rather than homogenous, especially when it comes their positions on non human animals 
(Waldau 2000).  This intrinsic diversity is an asset, as there is much we can learn about public 
perspectives on chimeric research by exploring the approaches taken to the central ethical 
issues within these different systems of religious thought. Indeed, as biomedical research 
increasingly becomes a global enterprise, those charged with regulation must be cognizant 
of how differences in religious positions on research involving human-animal chimeric 
organisms might influence and frame attitudes and beliefs about its practice. 
 
There is a clear divide between the Abrahamic and Eastern (Dharmic and Taoic) religious 
traditions as to the relevance of species to moral status.5  However, aside from issues 
surrounding concepts such as imago dei6 and the chain of nature, there is a plurality of views 
expressed in the commentaries, and many of these cannot be neatly categorised on the 
basis of common origins and foundational tenets. For example most commentators offered 
qualified disapproval for the practice of chimeric research – and half of them found grounds 
to reject the specific practices described in our vignette.  Only one of the commentaries 
contains an unqualified rejection of the moral permissibility of David participating in 
chimeric research.  
 
It is notable that all of the commentaries direct attention to the potential pain and suffering 
experienced by the animal as a consequence of experimental practices.  All of them 
emphasise that pain in nonhuman animals is of great moral importance, and, if 
                                                        
5
 Moral status is a concept that describes what an entity is owed by its own right, and not as a product 
of its instrumental value to others.    
6
 imago dei is a theological doctrine that human beings are created in the image of God, which gives us 
a special status in creation and the ability to actualize unique qualities such as spiritual self awareness 
and a capacity for moral reflection and growth.   
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experimentation was to proceed, must be mitigated and minimised as matter of urgency. 
Notably the Jewish and Confucian commentaries give a strong mandate for chimeric 
research if it advances some valued human end such as human health. While also noting the 
importance of furthering these types of public goods, on the issue of whether human need 
authorizes chimeric research the other commentaries are either heavily qualified or 
ambiguous. For example, for most Muslims the permissibility of deriving benefit from 
nonhuman animals also depends on the possibility for mutual benefit, such that the action 
or practice is not in conflict with the interests of the animal. Other commentators sought to 
emphasise that the moral permissibility of creating a grafted chimeric organism rests not 
only on the utility of the research, but also the animal’s capacity to be harmed and the 
amount of respect with which it is treated.   
 
In regard to the above, all of the commentators indicate that a sincerely held attitude of 
respect for a chimeric organism could preclude its creation and use for human purposes.  
Indeed the ‘strong’ protectionism underpinning the positions of the Anglican and Catholic 
commentators requires that any such creature should be given special consideration – to the 
extent that they are treated as full moral person until we have grounds to believe otherwise.  
However the two moral traditions differ as to what this protection requires.  The Anglican 
position is that prenatal human-animal chimeric embryos must be destroyed before they 
acquire basic capacities. Whereas, the Catholic position is that the very the creation of 
human-animal chimeras using embryonic stem cells is a moral wrong.  But should the 
research go ahead, then, according to the Catholic Bishops' Conference of England and 
Wales (2007), this concern also entails that any embryo with a preponderance of human 
genes should be considered a human embryo, and not discriminated against should its 
human mother wish to have the embryo implanted with the intent to carry the child to 
parturition.   
 
The moral status of the chimera and the basis of moral authority are the points on which the 
religious commentaries differ most markedly from each other. For example the 
commentaries from the Taoic traditions both emphasise that moral status and moral 
authority are functions of relational ties, and, therefore, chimeric organisms have no greater 
moral importance than any other animal.  However, the types of relationships emphasised 
are different, and so is their normative impact.  The Confucian position is that humanisation 
is contextual whereby the acquisition of ‘human relationships’ is an essential element of 
being and gives a higher moral standing. Care for the other is ‘graded and differentiated’ on 
the basis of the social distance between living entities. From the Buddhist perspective the 
moral standing of sentient life is innate rather than contextual. At its foundation, Buddhist 
philosophy gives fundamental importance to absolute  "eternal forms" that assign non-
human animals full moral standing, making no exceptions for human interests. All living 
creatures share a common history, telos and emotional life rooted in a shared ‘createdness’.  
Instead of measuring the moral worth of each individual, Buddhists believe we should treat 
all beings as our near relations, as ‘one’, and as such equally morally considerable.  
 
Even with their emphasis on scriptural authority, relationships are also central in the 
Abrahamic faith traditions because of their belief in the elevated position of humankind in 
God’s creation.  There are, however, differences in how our relationship with God, each 
other, and other animals should influence human actions.  For example according to the 
Catholic and Anglican moral traditions, the biological ‘humanness’ of any human-animal 
chimeric embryo is a central moral consideration – while the Islamic, Evangelical and 
Rabbinical position is that a primate chimera derived from human stem cells does not 
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directly entail the potential for humanisation.7  The point on which all of the commentaries 
from Abrahamic faiths agree is that the ‘animality’ of the chimera is of some moral 
importance.  The Rabbinical, Catholic and Anglican, Islamic and Evangelical commentaries all 
invoke a concept of stewardship as a guide for how humans should regard and treat other 
animals - we should care for other species as God would care for them. The Hindu position is 
somewhere in the middle of all the positions described above. Hindu belief systems deem 
some animals to be more spiritually evolved than others. These qualities individually and 
collectively influence the moral status of the living being. Therefore the social and scientific 
context of experimentation, the organism’s biological identity and its place in the hierarchy 
of creation could all be considered pertinent to the chimera’s moral status and the 
normative case to accept or reject proceeding with the experimental research.  
 
What most of the religious commentaries share with bioethical critiques of the type of 
research described in the vignette is the prominence given to two interrelated concerns: (i) 
that creating entirely new types of animals using reproductive technologies goes against a 
natural or divine order; and, (ii) that humanized prenatal chimeras are potentially an affront 
to human dignity. The first objections is founded on the tenet that there is an organization 
and direction to nature. Chimera creation is framed as a violation of a morally significant 
boarder that separates and differentiates the human from the animal. For the Abrahamic 
faith traditions, Confucianism and some schools of Hinduism, species difference is the 
foundation of moral meaning. In regard to this, most bioethicists now largely discount the 
threat of chimeras to natural categories (Haber and Benham 2012; Robert 2006), yet for 
many of our commentators the integrity of creation is of great moral importance. At the risk 
of over-simplification, this difference is construed through their respective conceptions of 
the place of humans in nature, and the limits this places on human agency.   
 
The second objection is based on the assumption that beings with ‘human’ capacities should 
be uniquely valued.  Under this view the creation of human to animal chimeras unsettles 
what it means to be human; traditional distinctions between human and animal cannot be 
sustained. Yet Buddhists, Mencian Confucians, and some schools of Hindu thought appear to 
be more egalitarian than the alternatives.  Each to a greater or lesser extent emphasizes the 
‘oneness’ of all living beings.  It is around the issue of human dignity that many bioethicists 
and people of faith are likely to find common ground, although their arguments are likely to 
rest on different sets of metaphysical commitments. The major point of difference is that 
bioethical arguments about whether the concept of ‘human dignity’ is morally relevant now 
tend to centre on the grounds by which such distinctions are maintained (Haber and 
Benham 2012; Melo-Martín 2008; Streiffer 2011).  Indeed the diversity of approaches that 
can be taken on this issue alone, through both secular and religious systems of thought, 
might account for some of the divisions in public opinions about transgenic research seen in 
pluralist societies such as the UK and USA.  
 
Practical implications  
Based on the commentaries above, the authors offer the following points as a summary for 
policymakers and researchers who seek a better understanding of religious perspectives on 
research involving engrafted embryonic human animal chimeras: 
 
 Prenatal chimera creation and research are likely to be highly morally problematic 
for many people of faith  
                                                        
7
 According to some Judaic scholars, the Talmudic and halakhic literature suggest that being born or 
formed by a woman is the primary criterion that defines human beings.  See: Loike J. D. & Tendler M. 
(2008) Reconstituting a human brain in animals: a Jewish perspective on human sanctity. Kennedy 
Institute of Ethics Journal 18, 347-67.
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 Chimeric research is conditionally supported by the Confucian and Jewish faith 
traditions but support is heavily qualified within Evangelical, Anglican and Catholic 
thought.  The position of Islamic, and Hindu faiths is ambiguous and contingent 
upon which of several criteria is deemed most important.     
 The potential for human good such as human health and well-being is necessary but 
not sufficient to ensure conditional support for chimeric research 
 The species of non human animal used to create a human-animal chimera is 
significant to the moral permissibility of the practice for all but the Confucian and 
Buddhist traditions 
 Objections to transgenic research on the basis of ‘human’ or ‘species’ dignity are 
shared by bioethicists and most faith traditions, but not by Confucianism and some 
schools of Hindu thought    
 Public support for transgenic research could be more robust if researchers seek to 
address religious perspectives on the moral status of animals and the moral 
significance of the integrity of creation. 
 
Finally, what the authors found to be most striking was the prominence given in most of the 
commentaries to scientific findings, concepts and methods.  This suggests that far from 
being anti-science, scientific discourse informs religious systems of thought, and, potentially 
vice versa (Waldau 2000).  Rather than being resistant to progress, the benefits of science 
are well recognised.  Indeed many of the commentaries are imbued with a highly progressive 
attitude that holds the advancement of scientific knowledge as being a public good for 
which other moral compromises could, and, in some cases, should be made. That is not to 
say that ‘anything goes’.  Set against such utilitarian impulses all of the contributors agree 
that many animals warrant respect and at least something in terms of direct moral concern 
in the way we care for them. Attention to each animal’s welfare, and the relief and 
prevention of pain in particular, is the key value shared by the faith traditions, as it is in most 
philosophically informed arguments.   
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